The purpose of this article is modest. It is merely to set out the annual production of silver in the mining district of Potosí between 1550 and 1735. The principal mines of the district were those in the hill (Cerro Rico) of Potosí itself; but there were many lesser mining centres in the surrounding areas, of which the most important are shown on Map 1. To determine production was the first object of an investigation into the mining history of Potosí in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which the author carried out between 1970 and 1974Obviously, in the study of the development of any industrial process, one of the prime points of interest is the end towards which that process is directed: output itself. Knowledge of the Potosí district's production of silver may also be of interest to historians studying other parts of the economy of colonial South America. Up to the eighteenth century the district was the largest producer of silver in the Americas; and indeed in the world. This silver exerted an economic influence at great distances from Potosí, especially on prices and on the direction and volume of trade flows. Historians with an interest in the economic history of both Spanish and Portuguese South America may find positive correlations between certain economic trends in their areas and silver output from Potosí.
A further reason for choosing silver output as the first object of investigation was that the study of production provides a good initial conspectus of Potosi's varying mining fortunes. Information on output can be obtained easily and quickly from the surviving manuscripts; whereas data on, for example, profits, the size of the labour force, or the amount of capital invested -all useful measurements of the progress of mining -are hard to come by. Once having gathered yearly output figures, the researcher knows what long-term trends, or short-term excursions from the trend, he must seek to explain. He has an overall pattern in his mind against which to gauge any opinions he may find -for example, in the reports of some administrative body -about variations in production and their causes. For instance, when reading accounts given in the manuscripts of the time of the civil disturbances between the factions known a s vicuñas and vascongados in the early 1620's, the historian of Potosí might find himself led to believe that the disturbances were causing the irretrievable ruin of the silver industry 2 . In fact, the production figures available from the Potosí treasury accounts show that the ructions had no discernible effect on output. Obviously there is a danger that the researcher, knowing from the production figures what the general course of the industry's development was, may tend, consciously or otherwise, to ignore or discard evidence which contradicts the trend. But he should be able to guard against that danger, since its existence is obvious enough. Once production has been established as securely as possible, attention can be turned to the more interesting and less concrete aspects of mining: technology, financial structure, administration, and above all use and conditions of labour. The author is at present preparing a book which will examine these topics discretely, and discuss production as a function of them.
Sources and derivation of productionfigures
Annual production figures in marks (8 ounces or 226.9 grammes) of silver are shown in Table 1 . These figures are derived from the amounts of tax collected by the treasury officials on silver production in the Potosí district. The tax figures are also shown in Table 1 , in pesos ensayados of 450 maravedís -the unit in which they are recorded in the treasury accounts. As will be seen from the Source column of Table 1 , nearly all tax figures have been taken from accounts now preserved in the Archivo General de Indias, Seville, and in the archive of the Casa de la Moneda, Potosí.
2) See, in general, Alberto Crespo Rodas, La guerra entre vicuñas and vascongados, Potosí, 1622 -1625 , Lima 1956 (2nd. ed. La Paz 1969 .
Peter J. Bakeweil Archivo General de Indias
The author's research on Potosí began in Seville, and so the Potosí accounts there were examined before those existing in Potosí itself. The Seville archive holds a good series of annual account summaries from Potosí, covering most years between 1550 and 1605. These summaries, the libros reales comunes del cargo y data of the caja real of Potosí, supplied most of the tax figures shown in Table 1 for the sixteenth century. The tax yields recorded in Table 1 are the annual totals given in the accounts; that is to say, the sum year by year of the bi-weekly or tri-weekly payments of tax made into the Potosí caja, as added by the treasury officials and their subordinates. Generally speaking, the officials' ability in addition has been trusted. Spot checks show that it was accurate to a fraction of 1 percent. There were frequent errors in summing tomines and granos, the subdivisons of the peso: but errors of over 100 pesos are rare. For a few years (1588, 1590-94, 1601-02, 1604-05) no accounts were found in the Archivo General de Indias. The silver tax figures shown for those years are taken either from correspondence about silver production found in the archive, or from accounts surviving in the Casa de la Moneda of Potosí. Where, as often happened, there were several sources for the silver tax yield in a particular year, the source closest to the original caja account was preferred. The figure given in the annual account summary was taken in preference to a figure given in a later account showing tax receipts over several years; but a figure from a source of this second sort was preferred to one given in general correspondence about the amounts of tax gathered. There were, in any case, only small discrepancies between the figures given in different sources. The series of Potosí caja accounts held in Seville ceases in 1605, and does not resume until about 1660. Even after then it is not continuous. For much of the seventeenth century it seems likely that copies of the Potosí accounts simply did not reach Spain. Either they were never despatched from the caja real in Potosí, which was subjected to many official inspections (visitas) in the first half of the century, with consequent great disruption of its administrative routine; or they were retained for audit in the Tribunal de Cuentas of Lima, which was created in 1605.
Casa de la Moneda, Potosí
Tax figures from 1606 onwards have therefore been taken from the archive of the caja real of Potosí itself, which survives in remarkably complete form in the Casa de la Moneda. The only year for which this archive failed to yield a figure was 1643. Some figures for the late sixteenth century, as noted above, were also taken from the Potosí archive. Where accounts for the same year survive in both Potosí and Seville, comparison reveals only the slightest differences, such as may be attributed to mistakes in copying or addition, between them. This is to be expected, since the accounts sent to Spain were fair copies of the yearly summaries retained in the caja at Potosí. These summaries (the Libros reales comunes del cargo y data or the Libros reales duplicados del común) were, as in Seville, the category of account most frequently used in research to obtain the yearly silver tax. Where these accounts provided totals of the year's payment of tax, the officials' addition was trusted. But for many years, especially in the period 1639-60, the officials had not added up the yearly total, so that the rather time-consuming task of summing between 80 and 120 tax payments per year had to be undertaken, for many of the years in question. Time did not permit extensive rechecking of this arithmetic, especially since the other 40 or so categories of caja income (ramos de cargo) were being collected as well -a task which demanded the addition of several hundred numbers for each year. Even with an adding machine such work is slow, and complete accuracy cannot be guaranteed. In occasional years, as the Source column of Table 1 shows, there was no Libro común or duplicado. In such cases, a Libro real manual was used, where available. The Libros manuales were the day-books of the caja, into which all incoming payments in one year were entered in chronological order of receipt, with no separation by ramo. Separate Libros manuales recording silver tax payments alone have survived for a number of years, particularly in the second half of the seventeenth century. These frequently contain monthly totals of tax paid. Comparison of amounts of tax recorded in the Libros comunes and the Libros manuales, where volumes of both sorts exist for a single year, shows negligible or no variation between them. Since figures were copied from the Libro manual into the común, no discrepancy should be ex-pected. For occasional years of the late seventeenth century, and for 1706-35, tax yields were taken from Vol. 417 of the caja real archive in Potosí -a small book entitled: MDCLXII. Libro Manual Borrador de Resúmenes de Quintos de la Real Contaduría de esta Villa Imperial de Potosí, que empieza a I o de enero de 1667 años, which records silver taxes received between 1667 and 1770. In the many years of the late seventeenth century where the tax shown in this volume can be compared with that given in some other source, only minute discrepancies are apparent. GR 417's record for the eighteenth century may thus be regarded with some confidence, and so was used after 1705 instead of annual account books, to save time.
The only years for which the archives of Seville and Potosí did not yield a tax figure were 1555 (in part), 1556-58 and 1643. All these lacunae, except 1555, could be filled using data from a table of Potosí silver tax yields, covering the period 1556-1780, given in the Mercurio Peruano of 20 January 1793. The publishers of this table declared that the figures had been sent to them from Potosí itself -presumably by a correspondent with access to the caja real records 8 . Since the amounts of tax shown in the Mercurio Peruano are in pesos corrientes (of unspecified value, but presumably of 272 maravedís, the normal value of sudi pesos), it was necessary to convert them to pesos ensayados of 450 maravedís for inclusion in Table  1 . The factor required to make this conversion should be 272/450 (= 0.60444). But this factor does not appear entirely appropriate here. If, for example, the total silver tax shown in the Mercurio Peruano's table for the years 1641, 42, 44 and 45 (= 3,615,753 pesos corrientes) is multiplied by the factor, the result is 2,185,522 pesos ensayados; which differs from the total for those years yielded by the original Potosí accounts, of 2,236,121 pesos ensayados. An unequivocal reason for this variation is hard to find. Since the Mercurio's informant presumably had to calculate his figures in pesos corrientes from the peso ensayado quantities shown in the Potosí accounts, the most plausible explanation is that for some reason he did not derive his pesos corrientes by multiplying the ensayado by a factor of 450/272. Given the discrepancy, a surer method of obtaining a 1643 tax figure in pesos ensayados from the corriente sum shown in the Mercurio seemed to be to establish the actual ratio between the corriente amounts given in the Mercurio for the years around 1643 and the corresponding ensayado amounts shown in the Potosí accounts; and then to use that ratio as a factor to convert the Mercurio's figure for 1643 into ensayado. The ratio between the sum of the Mercurio's corriente tax figures from 1641, 42, 44 and 45, and the ensayado total for the same years presented by the caja accounts, was therefore calculated. It was 3,615,753 corriente: 2,236,121 ensayado (= 1:0.61844). The tax yield of 924,659 pesos corrientes given by the Mercurio for 1643 was multiplied by the factor 0.61844, to give an equivalent in pesos ensayados of 571,846, as shown in Table  1 . A possible fallacy exists in this method. If the ratio year by year between the Mercurio's corriente figures and the Posoti accounts' ensayado figures varied greatly (meaning that the Mercurio's figures were probably not derived from the Potosí accounts, or at least not derived by a consistent method), then the ratio between the sums of the corriente and ensayado tax yields for 1641,42,44 and 45 would be no more than the average of the possibly random conversion ratios for those four years. If that were the case, using that average to find an ensayado tax figure for 1643 might give a wrong result. The possibility that this error had been made was almost eliminated by calculating the individual ratios for the years just mentioned between the Mercurio's corriente figures and the Potosí accounts' corresponding ensayado amounts. These ratios proved to be quite constant: 1641, 1:0.61836; 1642, 1:0.61854; 1644, 1:0.61862; 1645, 1:0.61824. It is therefore clear that whoever supplied the corriente equivalents of the Potosí silver tax income to the Mercurio Peruano was very nearly consistent in converting from one unit into the other. The small variations in the conversion factor that can be observed may be due to his arithmetical mistakes.
A similar method was used to obtain the equivalents in pesos ensayados of the corriente tax figures given in the Mercurio Table 1 are not quite accurate. As will be shown below, tax figures for those early years contained a small proportion of plata corriente, of uncertain value, which has been converted into pesos ensayados in the figures of Table 1, so that the yield of the silver tax should be expressed in a single unit. (To minimise confusion, it should be explained at this point that there was a considerable difference between plata corriente and the peso corriente. The former was a general term for unassayed silver of variable fineness; the latter was a minted and circulating coin, of, at least in law, a certain minimum fineness, and valued at 272 maravedís.) Lack of precision in that conversion may have caused slight misrepresentation of the value of the silver tax in the period 1559-61, and hence the small difference between the corriente to ensayado ratio of those years and the calculated for 1641, 42, 44 and 45.
Once the values for 1556-58 had been established, a tax yield for 1555 was calculated, merely as the arithmetic mean of the values for 1553, 54, 56 and 57. The resulting figure is arbitrary but probably not grossly inaccurate. The tax figure for 1555 is thus the only one in Table 1 not derived directly or indirectly from an account of the caja real of Potosí. No figure was found during research for the period before July 1549, though silver was probably being produced in Potosí as early as 1545 *.
Rate of tax
The basic rate of tax on silver production during the period shown in Table 1 was a fifth -the quinto. Subsoil rights belonged to the Crown, and miners paid the quinto in return for access to minerals 5 .
Despite its promising title, Bailey W. Diffie's article: Estimates of Potosí mineral production, 1545 -1555 , in: Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 20, 1940 no useful data on output in the early years.
') Ismael Sánchez-Bella, La organización financiera de las Indias, siglo XVI, Sevilla 1968, p. 87 (text and n. 4) .
That, at least, was the principle according to whiA the tax was levied. In practice the quinto was viewed merely as a valuable source of income to the Crown; and in discussions between miners and officials about the tax, the theoretical reason for its existence was seldom, if ever, raised. The fifth was reduced to a tenth (diezmo) by a real cédula of 23 January 1735 6 , which is the major reason why Table 1 has not been carried past that point. Levy of a tenth started in Potosí in July 1736, and with that change, the district's silver industry entered on a new phase of its history. The tax reduction was intended to revive the industry, and was successful in doing so. After more than a century of decline, production in Potosí began to rise steadily in the 1740's. That revival awaits its historian.
A further tax, known as the derecho de Cobos, was normally levied on silver production. This was in origin the fee paid to an official assayer of precious metals, rated at 1% of the metal examined. Alonso Martínez de Pastrana, visitador of the caja real of Potosí, described it in 1619 as the uno por ciento del marcador 1 . The American income from this levy was granted by Charles V to his secretary Francisco de los Cobos, as an adjunct of the office he also bestowed on him of assayer (fundidor, marcador mayor y ensayador) of all gold and silver refined in Peru and New Spain. Cobos was to enjoy the income for his lifetime, and his son should inherit it for his life 8 . In fact, the grant was revoked in 1552; and after then the tax was collected as part of the Crown's general income. In Potosí, the yield of the derecho de Cobos did not go to pay the assaying officials. They collected separate dues on the silver they examined.
There is no reference to the derecho de Cobos in the accounts of the Potosí caja before 1559, and for the purposes of this article it has been assumed that the tax was not collected before then. the quinto figures shown in Table 1 include, in addition to the fifth, a varying levy for Cobos. In the caja accounts, separate figures for quinto and Cobos are rarely given. This is a hindrance when, as here, it is wished to use the figures of tax received in pesos ensayados as a source for calculating production of silver by weight. If the tax were a simple fifth, it would be an easy matter to estimate the production on which that fifth was levied -multiplication by 5 and conversion of the resulting number of pesos to their equivalent in marks or other units of weight would be all the calculation needed. The arithmetic becomes a little more complicated when an additional levy for Cobos is included in the available quinto figures; and a further complication is introduced by the fact that in Potosí, Cobos was not always levied at the same rate. In order to obtain as close an approximation as possible to production by weight in any part of the period under consideration, the rate of Cobos must be known. From 1559 to 1585, it was 1%. From 1586 to 1652, it was increased to 1.5% 9 . After 1652, the effective rate becomes rather hard to determine. In that year a visitador of the Casa de la Moneda, Dr. Francisco de Nestares Marín, decided to abolish the levy of Cobos altogether on silver which was to be coined. Cancellation of this tax was the only way he could find to reduce the operating costs of the mercaderes de plata -the silver dealers who bought refined but unminted silver from miners and had it coined on their own account at the Casa de la Moneda. If mintage costs were not reduced, so Nestares predicted, the mercaderes would go out of business and the production of coin, essential to commerce and administration, would cease. Cancellation of Cobos ®) This increase was introduced by a treasurer of the Potosí caja, Diego de Robles Cornejo. According to Alonso Martínez de Pastrana, Robles had no authority for increasing the rate, besides a real cédula issued by Philip II for New Spain in 1578, which Robles brought with him to Potosí. This was probably a cédula reproduced in Diego de Encinas, Cedulario Indiano (1596), vol. 3, pp. 402-03, directed by the king to viceroy Enriquez of New Spain from El Pardo, 8 July 1578, and referring to the taxes to be levied on precious metals in New Spain. It specifically mentions the 1.5°/· rate. Pastrana, as an official of the Tribunal de Cuentas of Lima, should, however, have been aware that a law directed to all cajas reales of the Indies, given by Charles V and Prince Philip in Madrid, 5 June 1552, ordered that a 1.5% levy should be taken for 'fundición, ensayador y marcador was approved by the viceroy 10 . It is difficult to know, however, how much of the silver produced in the Potosí district was minted at this time. And the caja accounts fail to mention Cobos again until 1684, which may mean that the tax was not levied on any silver at all between 1653 and then. In this absence of information, it has been assumed that the quinto figures recorded in the Potosí caja accounts from 1653 to 1683 contain Cobos at a l°/o rate. This is an arbitrary assumption, but it cannot cause errors of more than 1% in the conversion of the quinto figures to weight of silver produced. After 1684, the rate of Cobos is variously recorded in accounts as 1% or 1.2% (uno y quinto por dento). For some years, two different accounts exist, one indicating a 1% rate, the other 1.2%. Fortunately, there are a few years (1684-88) in this last part of the seventeenth century where quinto and Cobos are separately recorded. Examination of the accounts for those years reveals that the 1.2% rate was apparently being charged; though that conclusion is not absolutely certain. It is clear that the derecho de Cobos was levied in these years rather erratically. Either it was not collected on all silver on which quinto was paid, or else it was collected at a varying rate. But on the evidence of the 1684-88 accounts, a Cobos rate of 1.2% has been assumed for the period 1685-1735.
Estimate of weight of silver taxed
Once the rate of tax is known, the weight of silver on which tax was levied can easily be calculated from the tax yield. In Table 1 , the results of this calculation are shown. The quinto figure (plus derecho de Cobos, where applicable) in pesos ensayados has been converted into the quantity of silver, in marks, that yielded that quinto. If tax was collected on all the silver produced in the Potosí district, then the figures in marks show the district's total output. A series of factors was calculated in order to make the conversion. The peso ensayado was valued at 450 maravedís. 2380 maravedís was the typical value of a mark of fine silver produced in Potosí. (The amalgamation process for refining silver ore, used by almost all silver producers in Potosí once it was introduced in 1572, yielded silver of high fineness.) If the rate of tax is a simple quinto, the factor for converting tax yield in pesos ensayados to the number of marks taxed is 5 X 450/2380 (= 0.945378). A factor which takes the derecho de Cobos into account can be calculated in the same way. A small complexity is introduced by the fact that when quinto plus Cobos were being levied, the latter was deducted first from the quantity of silver being taxed, and the quinto then taken of that quantity less the Cobos. Thus if the derecho de Cobos stood at 1%, that percentage was deducted first and the quinto taken of the remaining 99%. The total percentage of tax levied was, therefore, 20.8%; not 21%, as might at first sight appear 11 . The conversion factor from tax to marks of silver taxed is, accordingly, 100/20.8 X 450/2380 ( -0.909017). By a similar method, the conversion factor from quinto plus 1.2% Cobos is 0.902078; and from quinto plus 1.5% Cobos, 0.891866.
Plata corriente
In order to collect the taxes due on silver, the treasury officials' practice was to take by weight a fifth (and the percentage due to Cobos) of the consignment of silver brought to the caja real by its owner, and convert the weight, according to its fineness, into pesos ensayados -in which unit the account was kept. This procedure was simple once the amalgamation process had been introduced in 1572, since that process gave silver of consistently high fineness. But before 1572 ail silver was produced by smelting; and smelting ap- pears to have continued, on a decreasing scale, for several years after 1572. Silver refined by smelting was of very uneven quality. Variations in ores and in the expertise of refiners meant that some of it was of low fineness: that is, it contained a substantial proportion of other metals, especially copper. Nevertheless, in the period before Toledo founded the mint in Potosí in 1572, lack of circulating medium in the district made it inevitable that this low quality silver should serve as a means of exchange. It was known as plata corriente. It seems to have circulated in the form of mere lumps or bars; that it was not assayed is suggested by the existence and use at the same time of plata ensayada. A quinto of plata corriente was collected at the Potosí caja until 1578. After then, there is no record of corriente in the quinto accounts. Presumably only amalgamated silver was received and taxed from then onwards.
A difficulty arises in determining how much this early plata corriente was worth in terms of plata ensayada. Only slight and infrequent indications are given in the Potosí accounts of the fineness of the corriente received in quinto payments. From 1549 to 1573, a mark of plata corriente seems generally to have been valued at 2,000 maravedís, and a peso of corriente at 400 maravedís. Assuming that a peso of plata ensayada was valued at 450 maravedís, it is a simple matter to convert corriente to ensayada. The premium in the conversion -termed interés in transactions of the time -is 12.5°/o. That is to say, 100 pesos ensayados were attributed the same value in maravedís as 112,5 pesos corrientes. After 1573, the interés rises rapidly until 1577, when it reaches 56.25%, at which level it remains stable thereafter. The rates of interés used here to convert quintos in corriente to ensayada during the period 1574-77 were: 1574, 35%; 1575, 45%; 1576, 55%; 1577, 56%. These cannot be the exact rates of premium obtaining throughout each of those years, since the interés was increasing continuously and, moreover, plata corriente was, by its nature, of most variable quality. But the distortions incurred by using these rates are certainly not great. In any case, the proportion of plata corriente in the whole yield of quinto and derecho de Cobos was not high: about 11.5% in the period 1550-54; about 18.2% in 1570-74. It is difficult to say why the quality of plata corriente fell so rapidly after 1573. Some connection may be suspected with the introduction of amalgamation in 1572.
Perhaps silver producers who persisted in using smelting to refine their ores found their costs rising in comparison with those of amalgamation, and were tempted to adulterate their silver with other metals; or at least to economise on fuel by not smelting to the previous degree of purity.
Tax evasion
The amounts of silver tax collected at the caja real of Potosí are easy enough to determine. But the question this article sets out to answer is: how much silver was produced in the Potosí district? It is therefore necessary to know whether tax was paid on all the silver produced, or only on some fixed or variable proportion of it. This is the central procedural problem in trying to derive production from tax records. It has long been suspected that a large part of the Potosí district's silver was illegally exported, without being taxed, through commerce in the River Plate. Some was doubtless also exported, untaxed, through Callao, under the noses of the viceroy and other high functionaries of Peru in Lima. Even at the end of the colonial period itself, it was generally believed that two-thirds of Potosi's production had not been taxed 1S .
Do the figures in Table 1 which purport to represent annual production therefore indicate only a third of the district's true output? No definite answer can be given to the question. There is no better source than the yield of quinto and derecho de Cobos from which to estimate production. Other sources are more remote from production than the quinto record, and their use therefore introduces more unknowns into the calculation of output. From the records of the Potosí mint itself, well preserved in the Casa de la Moneda, it would be possible to find out how much coin was struck there year by year; and to some extent, no doubt, the amount of coin produced would be indicative of silver output. But there was rampant fraud in the mint; and it is impossible to know whether a constant proportion of output was being coined. The author admits that he has not done the archival work necessary to calculate production of coin in Potosí.
There is no good reason to believe, however, that the proportion of total silver output that escaped taxation varied greatly over time. It is true that when overall output was falling, there was probably more evasion of tax than when it was rising -since, other things being equal, profits would tend to be lower during a fall in production, and the temptation and need to avoid costs, such as quinto and Cobos, correspondingly greater. When production data are derived from tax collected, this effect would produce an apparent exaggeration of the rate of decline in output, especially at the beginning of the decline. But it would not alter the long-term direction of the production trend. It is possible, therefore, that in the seventeenth century, and the early eighteenth, when the Potosí district's output was certainly falling, there was an increase of tax evasion in comparison with the sixteenth century; and that therefore the levels of output indicated in Table 1 and Graph 1 are too low, by an unknown percentage, from abóut 1600 onwards. It is extremely doubtful, however, that tax evasion grew so much and so progressively in the seventeenth century as to produce an apparent decline in output of the magnitude of that suggested by Table 1 and Graph 1.
One method does exist of checking whether the levels of production indicated by the yield of quinto and derecho de Cobos are likely to be near true levels of output. Nearly all silver in the Potosí district was refined by amalgamation with mercury; there are very few references to smelting after about 1580. The amounts of mercury arriving in Potosí are recorded in the accounts of the caja real. Mercury was lost in the refining process, at a rate which varied with the quality of the silver ores being treated. Generally speaking, the löwer the silver content of the ore, the more mercury was lost in producing one unit of silver. The quality of ores found in the mines of Potosí itself fell, overall, from the time when mining began. As the mines became deeper, the ores in general became poorer; though large amounts of good ore were certainly discovered in the Cerro Rico of Potosí in isolated concentrations, all through the sevententh century, and were probably still found from time to time in the nineteenth. It is also true that other mining discoveries in the district of Potosí, made from the late sixteenth century onwards, yielded excellent ores on occasion, though not usually for very long. There can be little doubt, nevertheless, that the average quality of ores in the district fell as exploitation of them progressed. Research has so far revealed onlytwo estimates by contemporary witnesses of the rate of mercury loss suffered in producing silver in Potosí. The first was given in 1588 by the then corregidor of the city, Don Pedro Osores de Ulloa. He stated that with a new variety of the amalgamation process introduced the previous year, the weight of mercury lost, when paco ores (silver oxides) were being refined, was equal to the weight of silver produced. In the standard amalgamation process, he said, up to a third more mercury was lost. These rations may be expressed numerically in this way: with the improved amalgamation process, loss of 100 lbs. (one quintal) of mercury yielded a gain of 100 lbs. (200 marks) of silver; by the standard process, loss of one quintal of mercury yielded a minimum of 75 lbs. (150 marks) of silver 13 . Silver oxides were the ores most commonly mined and processed in Potosí. The second estimate of mercury loss is from 1635. The President of the Audiencia of Charcas noted that the standard current yield of one quintal of mercury was 80 lbs. (160 marks) of silver u . It is instructive to compare these estimates with the ratios of mercury lost to silver produced that the Potosí accounts actually reveal. The ratios are shown in Table 2 , by decades. Records of mercury arrivals in Potosí in the sixteenth century are incomplete, so the earliest decade that can be shown in the century are uncertain and so have not been included in Table 2 . Although mercury was not generally distributed immediately after its arrival, neither did it accumulate in large quantities from year to year in the treasury's store in Potosí. It is unlikely that the ratios shown in Table 2 have been much distorted because the mercury data used to calculate them referred to mercury arriving rather than to mercury distributed.
What is shown by comparison of the indicated with the estimated ratios of silver produced and mercury lost? The argument may be summed up in this way: if 1) the quantities of mercury shown in Table 2 to have entered Potosí were the only mercury available to the silver producers, 2) amalgamation was the only refining method used, 3) the estimates of Osores de Ulloa and the President of .Charcas were corréct, 4) the yields indicated by the Potosí accounts coincide with those estimates; then the output of silver shown in Table 2 for the decade to which Osòres' and the President's estimates apply is likely to have been the true output of silver in the district of the caja real of Potosí.
The first condition is the most difficult one to verify. In law, the Crown held a monopoly of the supply of mercury to miners in all the American colonies of Spain. Officially speaking, no mercury might enter Potosí except on the king's account; and as it entered, the quantity was noted. It is from those records of entries that the amounts of mercury shown in Table 2 have been calculated. But it is possible that official records were incomplete, or that mercury entered illegally in private hands. The mines of Huancavelica provided most of Potosi's mercury. In his study of those mines, Lohmann V i 11 e η a says that much mercury produced there was sold illegally to merchants instead of being passed directly to the Crown officials who, in law, were the only purchasers. By the mid-1660's, Lohmann implies, illegal sales were so great that official production fell far short of actual output 15 . Some of this 'illegal* mercury may have found its way into the Potosí district. Yet, if so, there is a strange lack of comment about it from the treasury officials of Potosí and the officers of the Audiencia of Charcas who frequently visited the city to make inspections of various sorts. Such 15) Guillermo Lohmann V i 11 e η a , Las minas de Huancavelica en los siglos XVI y XVII, Sevilla 1949, p. 371. people normally reported any flouting of the king's interest rapidly and vigorously -some out of sense of duty, others with an eye to promotion or other rewards. It is unlikely, though possible, that they were all in league themselves in the business of trafficking privately in mercury. On balance it is clearly possible that some private mercury reached Potosí, but it is improbable that the quantities were large in comparison with amounts of Crown mercury delivered to the city.
The second and third conditions are easily accepted. As said before, there is little evidence of smelting in Potosí after 1580, and amalgamation was the only other method of refining that the technology of the time offered. The estimates made by Osores and the President were probably correct, since they were drawn from the current experience of the miners of their times. Does the fourth condition, then, hold? Do the estimates of yield accord with the yields shown by the Potosí accounts? For the decade 1594-1603 there is good agreement. The indicated ratio of 166.3 marks produced per quintal of mercury lost falls comfortably within Osores' range of 150-200 marks per quintal. Admittedly, Osores' estimate referred to 1587, rather before the beginning of the decade in question. But the general quality of ores did not change greatly in the final fifteen years of the sixteenth century. Furthermore, Osores' upper figure of 200 marks applied only to the results obtained with the improved amalgamation process of 1587. That process was not universally adopted in the Potosí district. Consequently, some refiners would be obtaining yields of less than 200 marks per quintal of mercury. It is likely, therefore, that the output of silver suggested by the tax records of the Potosí caja for the years 1594-1603 is quite close to real output in that decade.
The silver to mercury ratio given by the President of Charcas in 1635 is somewhat higher than that indicated by the accounts: 160 marks per quintal was the estimate, while the accounts show a ratio of about 140.5 marks to the quintal. It seems, therefore, that the accounts understate true production around 1635 by some 12°/o. This is not a great distortion, and could be attributed to increased tax evasion in the seventeenth century in comparison with the sixteenth.
It is a pity that no more estimates of mercury consumption in the amalgamation process have so far come to light. Obviously, two figures constitute a poor base for an argument. Yet even with two figures, one conclusion of near certainty can be reached. If they are even roughly typical, it seems unlikely in the extreme that only a third, or even only a half, of the silver output of the Potosí district was taxed. If only a third had paid the quinto and derecho de Cobos, then the true levels of production would be three times higher than those shown in Table 1 and Graph 1. If that were the case, the weight of silver produced per quintal of mercury lost would be three times higher than the figures shown in Table 2 -that is, taking the minimum and maximum levels, between about 350 (3 X 117.8) and 500 (3 X 166.3) marks. Such yields are beyond the bounds of belief. Throughout sixteenth and seventeenth century Spanish American mines, the generally accepted ratio was 100 marks per quintal of mercury lost. In the most productive silver mining district of seventeenth century Mexico, that of Zacatecas, 120 marks per quintal were considered a high yield 16 . In late eighteenth century Potosí 120-130 marks per quintal were considered normal 17 . Thus with yields of over 150 marks per quintal, seventeenth century Potosí was well above the norm for its time. Only a vast movement of illegal, privately-traded mercury, totalling twice the arrivals of Crown mercury, could have produced apparent yields of 350-500 marks per quintal. There is no evidence of private traffic in mercury on that scale.
The general movement of the silver to mercury ratios shown in Table 2 is worth a short commentary. An overall downward trend is clear, which probably reflects the general fall in the quality of ores in the Potosí district as time went by. For quite a simple reason, more mercury was lost per unit of silver gained, as the quality of ores fell. The loss was mainly mechanical: mercury escaped literally down the drain in the stage of the amalgamation process where the ore was washed. As the silver content of the ore declined, more ore had to be refined, and washed, to produce the same amount of silver; and le ) D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, Colonial silver mining: Mexico and Peru, in: Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 4, November 1972, pp. 545-79, p. 556 . Also, P. J. Bake well, Silver mining and society in colonial Mexico, Zacatecas 1546 -1700 , Cambridge (England) 1971 ) Pedro Vicente Cañete y Domínguez, Guía histórica, física, política, civil y legal de gobierno e intendencia de la provincia de Potosí, (1791), p. 70 (of the edition used, of Potosí 1952). more mercury was consequently washed away 18 . The upward variations in the generally declining course of the yield can be attributed to discoveries of new deposits of richer ores in various parts òf the district. The recovery apparent in the two decades 1626-45 is probably due in the main to a rich strike at Chocaya, some 150 kms. south of Potosí, in the early 1630's. (The wealth of Chocaya is the cause of the upward surge of Graph 1 in 1635). The Chocaya boom was short-lived; the mines soon flooded. Silver to mercury yield lapsed again, as general ore quality continued to fall, to lower levels than before. But in the last third of the seventeenth century, yields recovered. Once again, improvement in ore quality is probably the reason. This time it was due to the discovery and exploitation of rich mines in the extreme south of the Potosí district -of which more will be said below.
Mines outside Potosí
There can be no historian of Spanish America who has not heard of Potosí; some will have heard of Porco; there can be very few who have heard of las Salinas de Garci Mendoza, Tatasi, Ocuri, Chocaya, Tomahavi -to mention only a few of the lesser mining centres in the Potosí district. Lesser they certainly were; but at different times each produced a far from negligible quantity of silver. It is, unfortunately, only after 1660 that any estimate can be made of output in mines outside Potosí itself; for only after then do the treasury accounts show separately the tax received on silver produced in Potosí and that received on silver from the rest of the district. The richest mines outside Potosí in the late seventeenth century were those in the district known as the 'provincia de los Lipes', so named after the Indians who lived there. The area was a large and desolate part of the southern altiplano, stretching west roughly from the site of modern Uyuni to the ranges bordering the plateau, and south as far as the northern parts of present-day Argentina. The major mines in los Lipes were Esmoraca, Esmoruco, and above all San Antonio del Nuevo Mundo. Table 3 shows what percentage of the total amount of silver registered for taxing at the Potosí caja was produced outside Potosí itself between 1660 and 1720. Notes in the accounts indicate that most of this silver came from San Antonio. Quantities are shown in marks in Table 3 , derived from the tax yield by the same methods as were used in Table 1 . The proportion from the district varies widely, but in many years before 1700 is over a quarter of the total from Potosí and district together, and in some, over a third. After 1700 it generally declines, for reasons so far unknown
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. It is plain therefore that though Potosí deserves its fame as a great source of silver, the lesser mines of its district, now mostly unknown even to Bolivians, were no mean workings. Since in 1660 and 1661 the mines outside Potosí were, according to the tax record, yielding nearly 40% of the Potosí caja's quinto income, it is probable that they were producing a sizeable proportion of it before that. What proportion, there is no means of knowing.
Cause s of variations in output trend
A full exploration of the reasons why production in the Potosí district varied as it did before 1735 would be a lengthy matter. All that will be done here is to state the major determinants of the production trend.
That trend divides naturally into three sections. The first runs from the discovery of the Potosí deposits, usually taken to have been in 1545, to the introduction of amalgamation in 1572. The second section extends over the next 20 years, in which production was rising very rapidly to a peak in the early 1590's. The third consists of the following 140 years, during which production declined gradually, with occasional brief recoveries, until it reached, at the start of the eighteenth century, the levels of the pre-amalgamation era.
The mining history of the first period is shadowy. Its main char-
19) The 'Minas' section of the Archivo Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre, contains abundant material for the history of the lesser mines of the Potos! district in the late seventeenth century. For lack of time, the author was unable to investigate these manuscripts. acteristics were the use of primitive smelting techniques, exploitation of rich ores near the surface, and the employment of small numbers of labourers -that is, small in comparison with the labour force that was to be put to work in Potosí later. It seems that in this early period the Spanish owners of mines took little part in working the deposits, but merely rented their mines out to Indians in return for a part of the ore extracted. As the workings became a little deeper, the quality of ores started to fall, and output, as measured by the quinto, declined continuously.
The second period is dominated by the reforms instituted by Viceroy Toledo. His greatest contribution to the restoration of the Potosí industry was undoubtedly to introduce amalgamation -a task which he pursued with vigour and enthusiasm. Since this process could refine economically ores of quite low silver content, mines which had run into ores too poor for smelting suddenly became productive again. Moreover, mudi ore that had been mined before 1572, but then discarded as of poor quality, could be processed by amalgamation. Toledo's other great innovation, a less happy one, was the mita. He arranged that forced Indian labour should be brought to Potosí from a large number of towns and villages, of which the most distant were not far from Cuzco. The whole altiplano to the north of Potosí became the catchment area from which the great labour force was drawn. Toledo designed the mita so that, at any given moment, over 4,000 forced labourers should be at work in the mines and refining mills of Potosí. The system probably did not function as intended for very long after his departure from Peru in 1580. But is certainly enlarged the mining industry's labour force to a size far above what it had been before Toledo's time. Real wages were probably lower than before, though that seems to have been far from Toledo's intention. He appears to have sincerely believed that, with the growth of production in Potosí resulting from amalgamation, Indians would profit materially from being sent to work there 20 . The amalgamation process demanded machinery for crushing ores. A major characteristic of this second period was, therefore, large capital spending on refining mills, and on dams for storing water to drive the mills during the dry part of the year.
In the third, long period, most of the tendencies of the second were reversed. The quality of ores fell -though, in truth, that was no more than the continuation of an earlier trend. What was new after 1590 was that, whereas in the 1570's amalgamation had made it possible to process at a profit ores that could not be refined profitably by smelting, now there was no technological innovation available to deal with ores of quality so poor that amalgamation could not extract the silver from them economically. With the ever increasing depth of mines, negrillos (silver sulphides) came to form a growing proportion of the ore extracted. Experimentation with new methods of processing negrillos never ceased, but no adequate technique was discovered. Another consequence of the increasing depth of the shafts was a rise in the costs of extraction. Labour costs also probably rose. Decline of Indian population in the area from which the mita was drawn, caused partly by disease and ill treatment, and partly by the flight to other areas of Indians who wanted to avoid the mita, meant that ever fewer forced labourers worked in Potosí; the fall in the number of mitayos was to some extent made good by an increase in the use of voluntary workers. Voluntary labour was dearer, though its extra cost may have been offset to some degree by its greater expertise. As costs rose and the quality of ore still declined, profits inevitably fell, or disappeared. It would be logical to suppose that in such a situation new investment also declined; and indeed there is evidence that insufficient new adits (socavones) for mine drainage and access to deposits were cut in the seventeenth century, especially in the Cerro Rico of Potosí itself. Many of the dams and aqueducts built to provide hydraulic power for milling were allowed to fall into disrepair. Little new mining exploration was undertaken in the Cerro. Entrepreneurial energies were directed rather to opening up new mines in other parts of the district, with some success 21 .
Oruro Table 4 sets out such production figures for Oruro in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as research has so far revealed. The yield of the silver taxes -a constant quinto plus 1.5% derecho de Cobos -has been converted into production in marks by the same method as was used for Potosí in Table 1 . All remarks made in reference to Potosí about the reliability of the derived production data naturally apply to these Oruro figures. For lack of information on mercury at Oruro, it is not yet possible to check the accuracy of the output figures shown in Table 4 through calculations of mercury consumption per unit of silver produced.
That there was silver in the hills of Oruro was known in the time of Toledo. But it was not until 1606-07 that the major strikes were made that caused Oruro to become a large producer of silver, second only to Potosí in the province of Charcas 82 . In 1607, immediately the potential of the mines became apparent, a caja real was founded, doubtless to ensure that evasion of silver taxes should be as small as possible. Thereafter the caja of Oruro remained as an enclave in the jurisdiction of the caja of Potosí, its main revenue coming from the silver taxes paid by the miners of the town (with perhaps a small amount of tax being paid by silver producers in the nearby mines of Paria), and from the sale of mercury to the miners. Geographically, the mines of Oruro should perhaps be considered as a component of the silver industry of Potosí. But production at Oruro has not been added here to that registered at the caja of Potosí, partly became Oruro was a separate entity, being a town of some size with a sense of its particular identity, and partly because the production data found so far for Oruro are incomplete. 
